Position-Based Quantum Cryptography: Impossibility and Constructions

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Date: 
2011-01-10
Author(s): 

H. Buhrman, N. Chandran, S. Fehr, R. Gelles, V. Goyal, R. Ostrovsky, C. Schaffner

Reference: 

Proceedings of the Workshop on Quantum Information Processing (QIP, 2011)

In this work, the authors study position-based cryptography in the quantum setting. On the negative side, they show that if adversaries are allowed to share an arbitrarily large entangled quantum state, no secure position-verification is possible at all. On the positive side, they show that if adversaries do not share any entangled quantum state but can compute arbitrary quantum operations, secure position-verification is achievable. In models where secure positioning is achievable, it has a number of interesting applications. For example, it enables secure communication over an insecure channel without having any pre-shared key, with the guarantee that only a party at a specific location can learn the content of the conversation. More generally, they also show that in settings where secure position-verification is achievable, other position-based cryptographic schemes are possible as well, such as secure position-based authentication and position-based key agreement.